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Abstract
Algorithms that rely on a pseudorandom number generator often lose
their performance guarantees when adversaries can predict the behavior
of the generator. To protect non-cryptographic applications against such
attacks, we propose ‘strong’ pseudorandom generators characterized
by two properties: computationally indistinguishable from random
and backtracking-resistant. Some existing cryptographically secure
generators also meet these criteria, but they are too slow to be accepted
for general-purpose use. We introduce a new open-sourced generator
called ‘Randen’ and show that it is ‘strong’ in addition to outperforming
Mersenne Twister, PCG, ChaCha8, ISAAC and Philox in real-world
benchmarks. This is made possible by hardware acceleration. Randen
is an instantiation of Reverie, a recently published robust sponge-like
random generator, with a new permutation built from an improved
generalized Feistel structure with 16 branches. We provide new bounds
on active s-boxes for up to 24 rounds of this construction, made possible
by a memory-efficient search algorithm. Replacing existing generators
with Randen can protect randomized algorithms such as reservoir
sampling from attack. The permutation may also be useful for wide-
block ciphers and hashing functions.
1 Introduction
Pseudorandom number generators are very widely used. For example, search-
ing Github for C++ code containing mt19937 (Mersenne Twister) returns
220,000 hits. Some of these usages will be vulnerable to unexpected corre-
lations [1] or exploitation by attackers [2]. To avoid having to audit each
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call site, we propose to replace most of them with our new fast and ‘strong’
generator.
1.1 Definition of strong
In this paper, we choose to characterize a strong deterministic random
generator by two properties:
1. Even relatively powerful adversaries able to generate and store up
to 264 random outputs cannot distinguish the output from random
unless they know the current state. This property is useful even for
non-cryptographic applications: it implies empirical randomness, which
reduces the likelihood of flaws such as correlations that might affect
simulations [1]. This property also ensures adversaries cannot predict
future outputs, which makes it harder for them to trigger worst cases
in randomized algorithms.
2. Past outputs cannot be reconstructed even after the state is com-
promised. This is known as enhanced backward secrecy [3], forward
security [4] and backtracking resistance [5]. We use the latter name
because it is more clear. This may not be necessary for simulation
applications, but it prevents adversaries from discovering past behavior,
e.g. which inputs were sampled.
The notion of ‘robustness’ from the literature also requires generators to
recover security after a state compromise [4]. This is typically achieved by
periodically reseeding from an entropy source. However, our applications
require at least the option of deterministic results for reproducibility and
debugging. Our definition of ‘strong’ describes the achievable security in this
model.
1.2 Existing generators
RC4 was a popular stream cipher designed in 1987, but attacks with practi-
cal complexity have recently been published [6].
ISAAC was published in 1996 and has some similarities with RC4. It has
many weak initial states, though the resulting biases can be avoided
with a modified algorithm [7]. Despite the large 1024 byte state, ISAAC
is relatively fast and widely used [8][p. 200].
ChaCha20 is an ARX-based hash/stream cipher used by OpenBSD arc4random
and Linux 4.8 /dev/urandom. It is an order of magnitude slower than
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some general-purpose generators [9][p. 41]; a similar result is observed
in our benchmark. Note that a ChaCha20 generator reportedly fails
one part [8][p. 205] of the dieharder test of empirical randomness.
Tyche-i is based on ChaCha and reaches 1.5 cycles per byte [10]. How-
ever, its authors discovered some short cycles and recommended a
workaround that is seven times slower [11].
Mersenne Twister is a popular general-purpose generator included in the
C++ standard library. It is fast but not strong: the generated numbers
are an easily inverted bijection (‘tempering function’) of a portion of
the state, so adversaries learn the entire state after generating one full
buffer.
xorshift128+ and xoroshiro128+ [12] fail a PractRand test due to lack
of randomness in the lower bit [13]; the latter is also easily distinguish-
able from random [14].
Philox is a noncryptographic counter-based generator with an iterated bijec-
tion based on a Feistel network using double-width multiplications [15].
It passes the TestU01 suite by construction [16]. GPU implementations
achieve very high throughput [15], but our benchmarks indicate our
hardware AES-based permutation is twice as fast on CPUs.
PCG includes an extension that XORs the output of a 128-bit generator
with one of 32 table entries [9]. Periodically scrambling the table using
entropy from the state might be sufficient for backtracking resistance,
which the previously mentioned generators lack. However, PCG makes
no concrete security claims [17]. Although its statistical quality appears
good, we are unaware of any existing proofs of indistinguishability and
backtracking resistance, so PCG is not known to be strong.
AES-CTR is a block-cipher mode that can be used as a generator by
enciphering all-zero plaintexts [15]. Although indistinguishable from
random, this lacks backtracking resistance. Once the attacker knows the
current counter value and key, they can reconstruct all prior outputs.
AES-CTR-DRBG is a strong generator specified in NIST 800-90A [5].
Similarly to Fortuna [18], it periodically re-keys based on the current
output. However, this is about five times slower than AES-CTR, and
too slow for general purpose use (see Section 7). Note that relaxing the
re-keying requirements, e.g. only after every 100 blocks, greatly reduces
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the overhead and could yield a faster generator. However, applications
may not be willing to accept exposing several thousand prior outputs
when the state leaks.
Fast-key-erasure RNGs are a more efficient alternative to CTR-DRBG
without the potential for unsafe usage [19]. Bernstein reiterates the
importance of backtracking resistance and proposes to generate a buffer
of random bits using a stream cipher, immediately overwriting its key
with part of the buffer, and returning the rest. However, there are two
integration issues with this approach. If the stream cipher relies on
AVX2 or AVX-512 SIMD for speed [20], there is a risk of slowing down
the entire application. Frequency throttling has been identified as a
cause [21], but this only applies to ChaCha20-Poly1305. Salsa/ChaCha
are unaffected because they only require low-power operations, whereas
the multiplications in Poly1305 trigger throttling. Instead, we are
concerned about another AVX2 implementation detail: a warmup
period of about 60,000 cycles triggered by the first AVX2 instruction
within a 675 µs window. During this time, SIMD instructions are
considerably slower; Haswell CPUs can even stall for 10 µs due to
their internal voltage regulator. Thus, sporadic use of stream ciphers
relying on AVX2/AVX-512 can slow down the entire application, or
even unrelated jobs running on the same socket. The second integration
issue is buffer size. Stream ciphers are considerably slower for small
buffers [22], which are preferred by applications and library writers
because generators may be short-lived or only used to produce a few
numbers. Our proposed approach avoids both issues. First, 128-bit AES
hardware runs at full frequency without warmup, and is performance-
portable to other 128-bit SIMD architectures – see our measurements
in Section 7. Second, our Feistel permutation does not require a buffer
larger than its 256-byte size.
We are unaware of any existing generator that is both strong and fast in
real-world applications.
1.3 Intended applications
We argue that the default choice of random generators should be ‘strong’.
This makes it harder to attack randomized algorithms and trigger skewed
samples or worst-case performance. Security-critical applications such as
generating cryptographic keys should continue to use well-studied and trusted
cryptographic generators such as Fortuna [18]. However, these are too slow
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to be accepted for general use. For example, we have tens of thousands of
high-end CPU cores occupied by general-purpose random generators. Thus,
the speed of our proposed generator is important. Because Mersenne Twister
is commonly used in C++ applications (see Github usage above), we assume
its level of performance is generally acceptable. The Randen generator is
designed to reach similar performance.
Note that applications that require many random numbers without any
concern for security (such as Monte-Carlo simulations) may still prefer a
faster but weaker generator such as pcg32 [17]. For other applications, we
suggest using Randen because it is strong and tends to outperform Mersenne
Twister (see Section 7).
1.4 Contributions
This paper makes four contributions:
• Introducing Randen1, a new generator based on Reverie [23] instanti-
ated with a generalized Feistel structure [24] (Section 2).
• Arguing that Randen is ‘strong’, and explaining why this is important
even for non-cryptographic applications (Section 6).
• Showing that existing secure generators are too slow for general purpose
use (Section 7). By contrast, Randen outperforms Mersenne Twister
in some real-world use cases despite providing a higher level of security.
To the best of our knowledge, Randen is the fastest ‘strong’ software
generator.
• Proposing an efficient algorithm for lower-bounding active s-boxes in
16-branch generalized Feistel networks with SPSP-type round functions
(Appendix A). We provide results for up to 24 rounds, whereas prior
work reaches 18 rounds [25].
Absence of backdoors
We, the designers of Randen, faithfully declare that we have not inserted any
weaknesses in this algorithm/implementation, nor have we discovered any
weakness not described in this paper.
1RANDen = RANDom number generator, or beetroots in Swiss German.
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2 Specification
Randen is an instantiation of Reverie, a sponge-like construction that scram-
bles its internal state using a permutation [23]. To avoid the ambiguities
of pseudocode, we describe its parts using standard C++11, plus explana-
tory text. The permutation operates on 128-bit pieces of the state called
‘branches’. This corresponds to the block size of AES. For convenience, we
assume the availability of a platform-specific 128-bit SIMD vector type V
with associated Load, Store and AES functions.
2.1 Initialization
Randen operates on a 2048-bit state, of which the first 128 bits are the
inaccessible ‘inner’ portion corresponding to the ‘capacity’ of a sponge. The
remaining ‘outer’ bits are the generated random bits. To simplify initialization
of the state, we partition it into 32 64-bit integers, two per 128-bit branch.
Zero-initializing the state yields a valid generator, but applications will
typically set some of its outer bits to arbitrary user-specified ‘seed’ values.
Providing more than 128 seed bits may help against multi-user attacks
involving precomputation. We suggest a 256-bit seed, specified as four 64-bit
seed integers. For more thorough diffusion, the seeds should be placed into
‘even-numbered‘ (according to zero-based index) branches of the state, e.g.
the third (with zero-based indices 4, 5 in the array of 64-bit integers) and
fifth.
u i n t 6 4 t s t a t e [ 3 2 ] ;
memset ( s ta te , 0 , s izeof ( s t a t e ) ) ;
s t a t e [ 4 ] = seed0 ;
s t a t e [ 5 ] = seed1 ;
s t a t e [ 8 ] = seed2 ;
s t a t e [ 9 ] = seed3 ;
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2.2 Permutation
Randen’s Permute is a generalized type-2 Feistel network [26] with 16
branches of 128 bits.
Shuffle
F
s0 s1
F
s2 s3
s'0 s'1 s'2 s'3
Figure 1: One round of a four-branch type-2 generalized Feistel network with
a block shuffle. F is a 128-bit permutation consisting of two AES rounds,
described below.
It consists of two layers (Figure 1). The first (denoted RoundFunctions)
XORs odd-numbered branches si with a function F of their even-numbered
neighbors. F is the same as in Simpira v2 [27]: two rounds of AES. The first
round’s constant, denoted key, is unique for every instance of F. This avoids
any potential weaknesses due to weak or structured round constants, e.g. in
Simpira v1 [27][p. 12]. We will discuss the size and purpose of the constants
in the description of Permute below. The second constant is zero, which
enables an optimization below.
// Round f u n c t i o n : two−round AES with a unique round cons tant .
V F( const V even , const V key ) {
const V f1 = AES( even , key ) ;
return AES( f1 , ze ro ) ;
}
For every adjacent pair of even and odd branches, RoundFunctions loads
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the two corresponding 128-bit pieces of the state and overwrites odd with
F(even, key) XOR odd.
const V∗ RoundFunctions ( const V∗ keys ) {
for ( int branch = 0 ; branch < 16 ; branch += 2) {
const V even = Load ( s tate , branch ) ;
const V odd = Load ( s tate , branch + 1 ) ;
const V new odd = F( even , ∗keys++) ˆ odd ;
Store ( new odd , s ta te , branch + 1 ) ;
}
return keys ;
}
Note that the XOR can be computed for free because the last step of AES
simply XORs with its round constant. We change the second AES round
constant in F from zero (which has no effect) to odd. The key passed to
each call to F comes from an array of eight AES keys.
The second layer of the Feistel network (denoted BlockShuffle) rear-
ranges the 128-bit branches into the prescribed order [24][p. 21, no. 10]. We
permute the state such that the previous branch 7 comes first, followed by 2,
13, 4 and so on (see shuffle below):
void BlockShu f f l e ( ) {
u i n t 6 4 t source [ 3 2 ] ;
memcpy( source , s ta te , s izeof ( source ) ) ;
constexpr int s h u f f l e [ 1 6 ] = {
7 , 2 , 13 , 4 , 11 , 8 , 3 , 6 , 15 , 0 , 9 , 10 , 1 , 14 , 5 , 12} ;
for ( int branch = 0 ; branch < 16 ; ++branch ) {
const V v = Load ( source , s h u f f l e [ branch ] ) ;
Store (v , s ta te , branch ) ;
}
}
Together, these two layers constitute one round of a generalized Feistel net-
work. The final permutation Permute consists of 17 rounds. Each invocation
of the RoundFunctions layer requires eight AES round constants, for a total
of 2176 bytes.
void Permute ( ) {
// Round keys f o r one AES per F e i s t e l round and branch .
const V∗ keys = Keys ( ) ;
for ( int round = 0 ; round < 17 ; ++round ) {
keys = RoundFunctions ( keys ) ;
B lockShu f f l e ( ) ;
8
}
}
The keys can be a fixed array of nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers shared
by all generators. However, our indistinguishability result (Section 6.1)
assumes a keyed/secret permutation, otherwise attackers could distinguish
the permutation from random by querying it and verifying the expected
result. Applications running on secure servers may reasonably expect that
attackers do not have access to the key. For additional safety, applications
could instead generate the keys at startup using a stream cipher such as
ChaCha20 keyed with 256 bits obtained from a trusted source such as the
operating system. Note that the generator remains backtracking-resistant
(Section 6.2) even if the keys are leaked.
2.3 Generator
Now that we have defined the permutation, Reverie’s Generate produces
random outer bits by invoking Permute on the state and XORing the inner
bits with the value they had before the permutation, which cannot be reversed
by an attacker with knowledge of the current state [23]:
void Generate ( ) {
const u i n t 6 4 t p r ev inne r [ 2 ] = { s t a t e [ 0 ] , s t a t e [ 1 ] } ;
Permute ( ) ;
// Ensure b a c k t r a c k i n g r e s i s t a n c e .
s t a t e [ 0 ] ˆ= prev inne r [ 0 ] ;
s t a t e [ 1 ] ˆ= prev inne r [ 1 ] ;
}
As a result, the last 1920 bits of state are uniform random and available
for use. In practice, the generator is packaged as a C++ ‘random engine’
that returns 32 or 64-bit bundles of random bits and calls Generate again
once all remaining bits have been consumed.
3 Rationale
Here we briefly justify design decisions.
The AES block cipher is well-understood and often hardware-accelerated.
Intel’s AESNI instructions [28] are five to ten times faster than opti-
mized software implementations [29, 30]. This implies a software-only
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Randen would be unacceptably slow (and likely vulnerable to side-
channel attacks). On CPUs without hardware AES, it may be faster
to replace AES with SIMD-friendly permutations such as ChaCha [22].
However, most modern CPUs have AES hardware, including POWER
(VCIPHER [31]) and ARMv8 (AESE [32]).
Two AES rounds are necessary for full-bit diffusion [27] and more efficient
than a single round in terms of the ratio of active s-boxes2 [33].
Dense and independent AES round keys ensure that an AES round
breaks the symmetry of plaintext with all-equal columns. We use
unique keys to rule out attacks similar to those on Haraka v1 [34] and
Simpira v1 [27]. This requires a total of 2176 bytes, which is somewhat
excessive, but the keys are typically hardcoded (but not necessarily
public) nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers and there is little cost to loading
unique keys because they easily fit in the L1 cache.
Type-2 generalized Feistel networks are often used to construct large
permutations from smaller blocks. These constructions are ‘sound’
in the sense that they are strong pseudorandom permutations after
sufficient rounds of a pseudorandom function [24]. In contrast to the
b > 8 variants of Simpira v2 [27], they enable good performance without
relying on multiple independent inputs to keep the CPU pipeline filled.
An improved block shuffle for the generalized Feistel network reaches
full sub-block diffusion (i.e. each block depends on every other input
block) much sooner than traditional cyclic shifts [24]. It also reduces
vulnerability to sliced-biclique [35] and integral attacks [36][p. 226].
16-branch generalized Feistel networks are the largest for which the
diffusion properties are known [35]. Larger branch counts have two
related benefits without requiring multiple independent inputs like
Simpira [27]. First, they enable parallel evaluation of the round func-
tions, which hides the long latency of AESENC [37]. Second, they can
benefit from increased hardware parallelism such as recently announced
quadruple-AES hardware [38][p. 2-14].
A 2048-bit permutation is a natural result of 16-branch Feistel with 128-
bit AES blocks. Larger states cannot be accommodated within the 16
SSE4 registers.
2in a standard type-2 Feistel with four branches.
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17 Feistel rounds improve the diffusion relative to the minimum of 16 rounds
required for Feistel block diffusion (propagating input differences to
each branch of the state) [24].
Reverie is an efficient construction for backtracking-resistant generators. It
avoids the heavy rekeying cost of CTR-DRBG and exposes fewer prior
outputs than an only periodically re-keyed stream cipher.
Reseeding the state from external entropy sources periodically is beyond
the scope of this paper because our applications typically require
reproducible sequences of random numbers.
4 Implementation details
We implement the algorithm in C++ using SIMD intrinsics that are available
on current Intel, AMD and POWER CPUs. The final optimized code is
quite short (only about 150 lines) and very similar to the straightforward
listings above! If state is a restrict-qualified pointer, Clang understands
that BlockShuffle simply renames memory locations. We have released
this code [39] under an open-source license so our results can be reproduced.
In the rest of this section, we study how well the algorithm maps to
the Haswell and Skylake microarchitectures. Despite the high-level imple-
mentation, the measured Permute throughput is within 5% of the lower
bound (one AESENC per cycle). Intel’s IACA simulator [40] reports the code
is bottlenecked by the ‘frontend’ in addition to the expected port 5 (AESENC),
but still claims its throughput should exactly match the lower bound. Note
that IACA does not model memory accesses, and the limited set of 16 SSE4
registers necessitates many spills to memory, so the 5% difference is probably
due to loads. However, we also investigate the alleged frontend limitation
using performance counters captured via the Linux perf utility.
Is decode throughput the bottleneck? This can be a problem because the
16 byte fetch window (unchanged since Pentium Pro) is too small for large
SIMD instructions (nine bytes for AESENC with a 32-bit offset). Two such
instructions do not fit in a fetch window, so only one can decode per cycle.
However, Sandy Bridge and later Intel CPUs include a decoded instruction
cache (DSB), which is very helpful because it avoids the 16-byte limitation.
Indeed we find 99.9% of µops are delivered from the DSB. However, the
effective DSB capacity is lower than the documented maximum of 1536 µops.
Fully unrolling the Feistel rounds generates about 750 µops and causes a 10x
increase in DSB misses. Unrolling by a factor of two generates good code.
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Is microcode a factor? In 2012 there was speculation that AESENC uses
the microcode sequencer (MSROM) [41]. We can confirm this is not the case
(on Haswell) because IDQ.MS_UOPS (79_30) is zero. Given the low values of
IDQ_UOPS_NOT_DELIVERED.CORE (9C_01), we can conclude the bottleneck
does not involve the decoders.
What about other stalls? LD_BLOCKS_PARTIAL.ADDRESS_ALIAS (07_01)
detects 4K aliasing between compiler-generated spills to the stack and loads
of round keys. This is difficult to reliably avoid, but only affects 1% of all
instructions. RESOURCE_STALLS (A2_FF) affect 18% of all instructions; 90%
of these are waiting for the reservation station. We speculate that this is
due to a lack of physical registers and/or waiting for loads. Either way, the
problem should disappear on Skylake. With its 32 vector registers, we can
devote 8 to the AES inputs and outputs (updated in-place) and 8+8 to hold
the XOR inputs for the next two rounds, thus entirely avoiding spills. In
summary, it appears difficult to further optimize the implementation. We
emphasize that the compiler and out-of-order CPU extract good performance
(within 5% of the lower bound) from our minimally annotated high-level
language implementation.
5 Smoke test
Every random generator should avoid ‘recognizable patterns’, which can
cause systematic errors in applications such as simulations [1]. In the next
section, we argue Randen is computationally indistinguishable from random,
which implies the non-existence of any patterns. However, general-purpose
generators are unable to furnish such arguments, so they instead apply
statistical tests to detect obvious flaws. Several batteries of tests are well-
known and often used for verifying empirical randomness. For completeness,
we also apply them to Randen. We begin with BigCrush from TestU01
version 1.2.3 [16]. Its interface requires a small wrapper around the raw
generator [42]:
randen : : Randen<u int32 t> eng ine ;
u i n t 3 2 t Rand32 ( ) { return eng ine ( ) ; }
int main ( int , char ∗ [ ] ) {
unif01 Gen ∗ gen = uni f01 CreateExternGenBits ( ”R” , Rand32 ) ;
bbattery BigCrush ( gen ) ;
un i f01 DeleteExternGenBits ( gen ) ;
return 0 ;
}
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All 160 tests pass for PCG [9] and Randen with original and inverted bits. By
contrast, BigCrush reports two failures when testing MT19937 and one near-
failure for AES-CTR (p-value of 0.000092, but it did not recur in subsequent
test(s)) [16].
We also test Randen with the current version 0.93 of PractRand [43]. To
avoid file or pipe overhead, we integrate Randen into the DummyRNG class
by having its raw32 function return Randen’s output. The test battery
is invoked with default settings via ./RNG_test dummy -multithreaded.
Running all tests up to the upper limit of 32 terabytes reports two ‘unusual’
p-values (0.9921 and 0.0013). Note that pcg64 also leads to an unusual
p-value (0.0016) in a much smaller test, and failures have more extreme
p-values, e.g. 10−351 for Mersenne Twister [13]. We conclude that Randen
passes state of the art tests of empirical randomness about as well as pcg64
and better than Mersenne Twister.
6 Security
Some developers are unaware that randomized applications can be vulnerable
to adversaries and we have observed reluctance to sacrifice speed for security.
It is expensive to audit tens of thousands of random generator usages to
determine the appropriate security/speed tradeoff. We therefore propose to
provide a higher baseline level of security than existing general-purpose gen-
erators. To gain user acceptance, we ensure our generator remains within the
performance envelope of Mersenne Twister. What security guarantees can we
provide? In this paper, a ‘strong’ generator is characterized by two properties:
computational indistinguishability from random, and backtracking resistance.
In the following, we show that these hold for Randen.
6.1 Indistinguishability
‘Indistinguishable from random’ is a very strong property often used in cryp-
tography. We emphasize that security-critical applications should continue to
use trusted cryptographically secure generators. However, other applications
also benefit from a strong generator. Indistinguishability implies the output
is unpredictable, which prevents adversaries from triggering worst case exe-
cution time in randomized algorithms such as Quicksort (quadratic rather
than linearithmic time), or influencing the samples drawn by randomized
online sampling algorithms.
We now apply a standard computational indistinguishability argument.
Suppose a deterministic adversary is given query access to either a real or
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ideal (i.e. uniform random) generator and returns 0 or 1 to indicate which
generator it is interacting with. We assume an adversary cannot issue more
than 264 permutation queries. Then, a real generator is computationally
indistinguishable from random if the distinguishing advantage (absolute
difference in probability of any such adversary returning 1 when given the
ideal vs. real generator) is negligible.
Lemma 1. In the ideal permutation model, if the Randen permutation is
replaced with an ideal permutation, Randen is indistinguishable from random
by adversaries limited to 264 permutation queries.
Proof. Randen is an instantiation of Reverie, which guarantees that the
best possible attack must guess its inner bits [23][p. 12]. That requires an
average of 2127 evaluations of the Randen permutation, which is beyond the
capabilities of our assumed adversary.
There are two practical difficulties with the ideal permutation model.
First, attackers can trivially distinguish a Randen permutation with known
key by simply querying it. In this section, we need to assume the permutation
is keyed. Second, a truly random permutation is impractical because its
representation requires log2 2
128! ≈ 1040 bits. We could instead argue that
the generalized Feistel structure of the Randen permutation ensures it would
be indistinguishable from random if its round functions were pseudorandom
[24]. However, our round function consists of two rounds of AES, and up to
three are efficiently distinguishable from random [44]. We could construct
a round function that is believed to be indistinguishable from a random
function by XORing two permutations [45] that are widely recognized to be
secure, such as 10 rounds of AES. Unfortunately this would be about ten
times slower. Instead, we will study known attacks on the actual Randen
permutation.
The security of Substitution-Permutation (SP) networks such as AES is
often established by showing sufficiently many s-boxes are active to resist
differential and linear attacks [27]. Such results are also available for general-
ized Feistel networks, but they are specific to the number of branches and
type of round function. We use 16 branches and SPSP-type functions (two
rounds of AES). Existing results are available for either situation, but not
both. 6 rounds of SPSP functions in a 4-branch type-2 network guarantee 6
differentially active functions [33]. 17 rounds of SP functions in a 16-branch
network with improved diffusion guarantee 78 active s-boxes [25][p. 226].
Later in this section, we provide new results for 16-branch networks with
SPSP functions.
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Table 1: Lower bound on active functions after a given number of rounds of
a 16-branch type-2 Feistel network with improved block shuffle. Derived via
exhaustive search in Appendix A.
Rounds Active Functions Rounds Active Functions
1 0 13 27
2 1 14 30
3 2 15 32
4 3 16 35
5 4 17 36
6 6 18 39
7 8 19 41
8 11 20 44
9 14 21 45
10 18 22 48
11 22 23 50
12 24 24 53
Note that 16-branch Feistel networks have a maximum impossible dif-
ferential characteristic of 14 rounds [24], and the sliced biclique technique
only attacks 15 rounds [35]. A recent attempt to find integral distinguishers
reports ‘difficulty’ for such large branch counts [36][p. 219]. We compute
new lower bounds for active functions in 16-branch type-2 Feistel networks
via exhaustive search. Details of the algorithm are deferred to Appendix A.
The resulting lower bounds are given in Table 1. Note that we are able to
compute bounds for up to 24 rounds, whereas prior results for 16-branch
Feistel networks only extend to 18 rounds [25]. A meet in the middle attack
[46] splits a permutation into three parts. Hence, we consider the number of
active functions after six rounds.
Theorem 1. The probability of differential characteristics and correlation
of linear characteristics of six rounds of the Randen permutation are at most
2−180 and 2−90.
Proof. Per Table 1, at least six functions are active after six rounds. Each
active SPSP function provides at least B(M) active s-boxes [33]. B(M) is
the branch number of the SP permutation layer, which is 5 for AES. Thus, at
least 30 s-boxes are active. Each active AES s-box contributes a maximum
differential probability 2−6 and correlation amplitude 2−3 [44]. Thus, the
overall differential probability and linear correlation are 2−6·30 and 2−3·30.
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Note that Simpira’s security arguments only require 25 active s-boxes [27].
Also, Table 1 indicates there are 36 · B(M) = 180 active s-boxes after our 17
rounds with SPSP functions. By contrast, the prior bound for SP functions
only guarantees 78 active s-boxes after 17 rounds [25][p. 226].
Claim. A keyed Randen permutation cannot be distinguished from random
with complexity less than 264.
This bound is a conservative estimate based on our initial analysis. Per
Theorem 1, differential/linear attack complexity is 2180 and 290. Symmetry
attacks on AES are also unlikely to succeed because our round keys lack
structure. Note that Randen involves 17 AES subrounds per 16 permuted
bytes, versus only 10 for the AES-128 cipher. Any distinguishers would seem
to imply new (or unknown to us) attacks on generalized Feistel with AES-like
rounds.
For comparison, a recent successful attack on the full SHA-1 involved 263
work at an estimated cost of 110,000 USD [47]. We assume this is a sufficient
deterrent to predicting outputs.
Lemma 2. If a computationally bounded adversary cannot distinguish the
Randen permutation from random, then they cannot predict the Randen
output with less than 264 work based only on prior outputs.
Proof. In this setting, adversaries do not know the AES round keys. The
only way adversaries can access the permutation is by requesting random
output. We can meet the requirements of Lemma 1 by instantiating Randen
with an oracle implementing a randomly keyed Randen permutation. From
the perspective of the adversary, this behaves in the same way as Randen
instantiated with a real permutation. Then, the Randen output is indis-
tinguishable from random, which implies unpredictability by contradiction
(predicting a future output would also allow an adversary to distinguish the
generator from random).
Note that “based only on prior outputs” excludes cases where attackers
gain access to the inner state. By contrast, NIST 800 90a requires prediction
resistance even after the state is compromised [5]. This would entail periodic
reseeding from external entropy sources, which we must avoid to ensure
repeatability. Instead, we note that side-channels such as core dumps and
paging [48] are less relevant in a server environment and can be mitigated
with the help of the operating system (using madvise and mlock). Then,
attackers can only guess the inner state at a cost of 2127, which is beyond
their assumed capability.
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6.2 Backtracking resistance
The second property is backtracking resistance: adversaries have a negligible
advantage at distinguishing prior outputs from random even if they gain
access to the state [49]. This is important for portable devices and long-
running applications without access to external entropy because it ensures
adversaries cannot reconstruct prior outputs. If a generator is robust, it also
provides backtracking resistance (also known as forward security) [4]. Reverie
is robust in the ideal permutation model [23] and the previous section argues
that instantiating Reverie with a random Randen permutation retains its
security guarantees. However, robustness requires reseeding the generator
from external entropy, which is not always possible in our applications.
We instead show that backtracking resistance follows from the security of
Reverie’s next function [23][p. 12], i.e. Randen’s Generate. Assume an
adversary has gained access to the current state and AES keys. This allows
them to invert the Randen permutation. Note that Reverie’s security model
assumes a public permutation that attackers can already invert. We will
illustrate the backtracking resistance in a scenario with two calls to Generate.
Additional calls do not affect the argument.
For the following, let us define new notation: the state after the first
(k = 1) and second (k = 2) call to Generate can be partitioned into
inner/outer parts ik and ok. Let i0 and o0 denote the uniform random initial
state. Per Lemma 1 of Reverie [23][p. 12], the return values of Generate
are indistinguishable from random. However, the attacker knows all random
outputs (i.e. outer states o0, o1) and learns the current state i2, o2. Does this
allow them to recover the remaining prior inner states i0, i1? Recall that the
final Generate returns Permute(i1, o1) XOR (i1, zero). All terms except i1
are known. However, the attacker cannot query the permutation in either
direction without guessing the i1 value at a cost of 2
127; this is best possible
attack on Reverie [23]. Hence, knowledge of o0, o1, o2, i2 is insufficient, and
adversaries cannot expect to distinguish prior outputs from random with less
than 2127 forward or backward queries to the permutation (e.g. by guessing
the inner bits) [23][p. 12]. Therefore, Randen is backtracking-resistant.
7 Performance
7.1 Contenders
We emphasize that our comparison involves three groups of generators, in
increasing order of security.
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Insecure generators
To establish a performance baseline, we include the commonly used but
insecure Mersenne Twister (‘MT’) as implemented by the C++11 standard
library. Note that faster variants of MT exist [50, 51]. However, we advocate
using more secure generators in most applications with the exception of
Monte Carlo simulations.
Medium-strength
Several recent generators are at least nontrivial to distinguish from random,
although indistinguishability and backtracking-resistance have not been
formally shown. We include ‘Philox’ [15] and pcg64_c32 [9] (‘PCG’), both
of which make no concrete security claims. We also place ISAAC into this
category – although no bias has been shown, there are doubts about its
security and similarity to RC4.
Strong
The third group consists of generators with security claims (see Section 6).
In addition to Randen, we include ‘ChaCha20’ (provided by Linux 4.9
/dev/urandom [52]) and ‘CTR-DRBG’ from NIST SP 800-90A (provided by
Windows 7 BCryptGenRandom). These have higher overhead, possibly due
to calling into kernel mode. We reduce this somewhat by using a 256-byte
buffer, the same size as Randen. To fully exclude the OS overhead, we also
include a user-mode SSE2 implementation of ChaCha8 by Orson Peters that
uses a single 64-byte block. Note that Bernstein recommends ChaCha20
instead due to its higher security margin [53].
7.2 Infrastructure
All generators except ‘CTR-DRBG’ are implemented in C++ and compiled
using Clang r331746 with -O3 -std=gnu++11. The ‘x86’ benchmark is pinned
to a single core of a lightly loaded dual-socket Xeon E5-2690 v3 clocked
at 2.6 GHz running Linux 4.9 with Turbo Boost and throttling disabled.
We also report performance on a POWER 8e clocked at 3.6 GHz (‘PPC’).
The ‘CTR-DRBG’ measurements are obtained on an Intel i7 4790K CPU
clocked at 4.0 GHz running Windows 7 x64 and using the Microsoft Visual
Studio 2017 compiler. To increase the precision and accuracy of generator
speed measurements, we use an improved version of the ‘nanobenchmark’
infrastructure [54] developed for HighwayHash. It prevents elision of the
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generator by passing its output as an input to an empty inline assembly
block marked as modifying memory. To reduce variability between runs,
it records high-resolution timestamps (in units of CPU cycles) from the
invariant TSC, uses fences to ensure the measured code is not reordered by
the compiler nor CPU, subtracts the overhead of the TSC reads and uses
the median (for small sample counts) or mode as a robust estimator of the
central tendency. As a result, variability between measurements (defined
as median absolute deviation from the median) is about 0.2%. To improve
comparability between benchmarks of different sizes, we divide the elapsed
times by the number of random bytes generated to yield cycles per byte.
Note that the PPC elapsed times are relative to its 512 MHz timebase, so
we multiply measurements by 7 ≈ 3600/512 to obtain CPU cycles.
7.3 Benchmarks
We go beyond conventional microbenchmarks by including three simple real-
world applications of random numbers: a Fisher-Yates shuffle [55], reservoir
sampling [56], and a Monte Carlo estimator for the value of pi. Together,
these exercise all consumers of random bits in the C++ standard library.
We emphasize that our measurements encompass the entire application,
viz.: the algorithm consuming random numbers (e.g. shuffling) plus buffer-
empty checks required by the C++ random generator interface plus the
generator itself. Thus, the reported throughput will naturally be lower than
best-case microbenchmarks of a stream cipher or merely generating large
quantities of random bits.
7.3.1 Microbenchmark
C++11 only requires amortized constant-time complexity for its uniform
random generators. This allows them to return numbers from a large buffer
which is periodically refilled. To measure the amortized cost, we must ensure
the elapsed time measurements include sufficient refills. Although the buffer
sizes are known, C++11 does not provide a guaranteed means of flushing or
querying the buffer. We therefore generate 800 KB of random bits such that
the cost of ‘wasting’ part of the final buffer is negligible.
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Table 2: Cycles per byte for a small loop, plus variability (MAD is the median
absolute deviation) and speedup factor of Randen vs. other generators.
Engine x86 (MAD) Speedup PPC (MAD) Speedup
Randen 1.54 (± 0.002) – 2.94 (± 0.007) –
PCG 0.78 (± 0.003) 0.5 1.68 (± 0.007) 0.6
MT 1.79 (± 0.001) 1.2 3.99 (± 0.014) 1.4
ChaCha8 3.02 (± 0.003) 2.0
ISAAC 4.08 (± 0.006) 2.6 7.91 (± 0.014) 2.7
Philox 4.70 (± 0.003) 3.1 9.94 (± 0.014) 3.4
ChaCha20 15.27 (± 0.018) 9.9 197.96 (± 0.315) 67.3
CTR-DRBG 16.80 (± 0.009) 11.2
The x86 microbenchmark (Table 2) seems to indicate PCG is twice as fast
as Randen, which is in turn 1.2 times as fast as MT. The trend is similar on
PPC. Despite their high precision (median absolute deviation below 0.2%),
these microbenchmark results are quite irrelevant in practice — which actual
application repeatedly calls a random generator and ignores the results? Any
that do should use the more efficient discard function instead. As we will
see, these results are not representative of real-world performance. There
are at least three reasons why microbenchmarks may mischaracterize actual
performance. First, their small working set leads to unrealistically high cache
and TLB hit rates. Second, tight loops benefit from special CPU decoding
hardware [57][p. 123]. Third, simple microbenchmarks may use fewer CPU
resources (e.g. registers and load-store buffers) than real-world applications.
7.3.2 Shuffle
For a more realistic use case, we measure a Fisher-Yates shuffle that swaps
elements at a randomly chosen position. Although the C++ standard library
provides an implementation (std::shuffle), its mapping of random bits
to uniform integers is quite slow. Instead of costly divisions, we use a
multiplication followed by bit-shift [58]. The resulting shuffle is about three
times as fast as std::shuffle. The array is 400 KB large, which exceeds
the 256 KiB L2 cache on x86 but fits into the 512 KiB PPC cache.
We observe different performance characteristics (Table 3) than in the
microbenchmark. As shown by the ‘Randen factor’ columns, Randen is 1.2
times as fast as PCG and slightly faster than MT on x86. By contrast, MT
is the fastest on PPC. In all benchmarks, Randen is roughly twice as fast as
ISAAC, which is still faster than Philox. Replacing ChaCha20/CTR-DRBG
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with Randen leads to an overall shuffle speedup of 7 to 8, and 36 on PPC.
We see nearly identical results on x86 for 100 KB and 25 KB inputs, which
fit into L2 and L1, respectively. This implies that caching and prefetching
are effective. Indeed VTune reports that only Philox and ChaCha20 have
high levels of load/store stalls: 45% and 85%, versus less than 30% for the
other generators.
Table 3: Cycles per byte for engines called from Fisher-Yates shuffle, plus
variability (MAD is the median absolute deviation) and speedup factor of
Randen vs. other generators.
Engine x86 (MAD) Speedup PPC (MAD) Speedup
Randen 2.19 (± 0.004) – 5.46 (± 0.014) –
PCG 2.65 (± 0.005) 1.2 6.65 (± 0.014) 1.2
MT 2.19 (± 0.004) 1.0 4.48 (± 0.021) 0.8
ChaCha8 3.63 (± 0.006) 1.7
ISAAC 4.15 (± 0.007) 1.9 8.19 (± 0.021) 1.5
Philox 4.87 (± 0.008) 2.2 10.57 (± 0.021) 1.9
ChaCha20 15.87 (± 0.027) 7.2 198.24 (± 0.917) 36.3
CTR-DRBG 20.45 (± 0.017) 8.2
7.3.3 Sample
Our third benchmark measures reservoir sampling, a randomized online
algorithm for retaining an 80 KB subset of a 400 KB data stream. It
probabilistically overwrites prior samples at random position. As with
shuffling, using a division-free mapping of random bits to integers is much
faster than std::uniform_int_distribution. We see similar performance
(Table 4), except that Randen is now 1.2 times as fast as PCG on x86, and
1.4 on PPC. On both platforms, Randen outperforms MT. Also as before,
speeds are comparable when reducing the input sizes to one quarter.
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Table 4: Cycles per byte for engines called from reservoir sampling, plus
variability (MAD is the median absolute deviation) and speedup factor of
Randen vs. other generators.
Engine x86 (MAD) Speedup PPC (MAD) Speedup
Randen 2.60 (± 0.008) – 4.97 (± 0.007) –
PCG 3.03 (± 0.009) 1.2 6.72 (± 0.021) 1.4
MT 2.82 (± 0.009) 1.1 5.32 (± 0.014) 1.1
ChaCha8 3.75 (± 0.008) 1.4
ISAAC 4.46 (± 0.014) 1.7 8.12 (± 0.014) 1.6
Philox 4.95 (± 0.009) 1.9 9.87 (± 0.007) 2.0
ChaCha20 13.46 (± 0.017) 5.2 159.67 (± 0.168) 32.1
CTR-DRBG 16.41 (± 0.015) 6.4
7.3.4 Monte Carlo
The fourth benchmark is Monte Carlo estimation of the value of pi via the
ratio of points that fall within a unit circle versus the unit square. This is
similar to the microbenchmark in that it calls the generator 200,000 times in a
fairly tight loop. Note that std::uniform_real_distribution is slow and
not actually uniform [59], so we again implement a replacement. It constructs
an IEEE-754 mantissa using the lower 53 bits of a generated uint64_t and
chooses an exponent based on the base-2 logarithm of its upper bit. The
results in Table 5 show that PCG is 1.2 times as fast as Randen on x86 but
slower on PPC. Randen outperforms MT on both platforms.
Table 5: Cycles per byte for engines called from a Monte Carlo simulation,
plus variability (MAD is the median absolute deviation) and speedup factor
of Randen vs. other generators.
Engine x86 (MAD) Speedup PPC (MAD) Speedup
Randen 2.14 (± 0.002) – 3.43 (± 0.007) –
PCG 1.69 (± 0.031) 0.8 3.85 (± 0.007) 1.1
MT 2.55 (± 0.015) 1.2 4.90 (± 0.007) 1.4
ChaCha8 4.58 (± 0.002) 2.1
ISAAC 4.35 (± 0.003) 2.0 8.54 (± 0.056) 2.5
Philox 4.97 (± 0.002) 2.3 11.62 (± 0.014) 3.4
ChaCha20 16.65 (± 0.006) 7.8 194.53 (± 8.428) 56.7
CTR-DRBG 17.37 (± 0.031) 9.3
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7.4 Discussion
To summarize the four benchmarks, we compute the geometric means of
the ‘Randen factors’ from the above tables, i.e. the cost (cycles per byte)
of other generators divided by that of Randen (Table 6). Due to the large
differences in the (lack of) security guarantees of the various generators, we
discuss them separately.
Table 6: Geometric means of Randen speedup factors across the benchmarks.
A value of 1.1 indicates the benchmarks run 1.1 times as fast after replacing
MT with Randen.
Engine x86 PPC
PCG 0.9 1.0
MT 1.1 1.1
ChaCha8 1.8
ISAAC 2.0 2.0
Philox 2.3 2.6
ChaCha20 7.3 45.9
CTR-DRBG 8.5
Insecure generators
One of our main results is that the Randen generator does not increase CPU
cost relative to the commonly used but insecure Mersenne Twister generator.
The geometric mean of speed ratios indicates Randen is slightly faster on
both x86 and PPC.
Medium-strength
Randen is about twice as fast as ISAAC and Philox in all benchmarks. Our
choice of geometric mean indicates PCG is the fastest on x86, and tied for
first on PPC. However, this is mainly due to its result in the (unrealistic)
microbenchmark. PCG is a good choice for Monte Carlo applications but
Randen is 1.2 to 1.4 times as fast for shuffling and sampling. Note that
ISAAC, Philox and PCG lack concrete security claims and have not been
shown to be indistinguishable from random nor backtracking-resistant. To
the best of our knowledge, Randen is the fastest software generator with
these properties.
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Strong
Is it feasible to use cryptographically secure generators as the default even
in non-cryptographic applications? This depends on the scale of usage. We
profiled production code running company-wide and found that traditional
non-cryptographic random generators account for tens of thousands of CPU
cores. From this and the above benchmarks, we conclude it would be too
expensive to use an OS-provided ChaCha20 (/dev/urandom) or CTR-DRBG
(BCryptGenRandom) as general-purpose generators. By contrast, Randen is
5 to 10 times as fast in real-world benchmarks. Switching from Mersenne
Twister to Randen would actually reduce cost (according to the geometric
mean of our benchmarks), while greatly increasing the baseline security of
non-cryptographic randomized applications.
8 Conclusion
Recent random generators have desirable characteristics: SIMD-accelerated
Mersenne Twister (MT) is efficient [51]. PCG has good statistical properties
[9]. AES-CTR is unpredictable by attackers. AES-CTR-DRBG ensures
backtracking resistance [5]. Thanks to recent hardware acceleration of AES,
a single generator can now achieve all these goals!
This work proposes Randen, an instantiation of Reverie [23] with a
permutation based on a generalized Feistel structure. We show that it is
‘strong’, i.e. computationally indistinguishable from random and backtracking
resistant. This high level of security is useful even for general-purpose
applications such as shuffling and sampling because it greatly increases the
attacker cost of triggering worst-case behavior in randomized algorithms.
Note that Randen is not intended for cryptographic applications such as key
generation, but the permutation may also be useful for wide-block ciphers
and hashing functions. Despite its statistical quality and resistance to attacks,
Randen is actually faster than the commonly used MT generator, ChaCha8,
ISAAC, Philox and a variant of PCG in some real-world benchmarks on
Haswell and POWER 8.
We invite external analysis and verification of Randen’s properties and
suggest it as a safer alternative to arguably obsolete [9][p. 6] algorithms such
as small linear congruential generators, linear feedback shift registers, well
equidistributed long-period linear [60], unaugmented XorShift, and MT.
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A Active Functions in 16-branch Feistel
Lemma 3. A type-2 generalized Feistel network with 16 branches and an
improved block shuffle [24] has at least as many differentially active functions
as listed in Table 1.
To the best of our knowledge, these bounds are new. Note that the 6-round
bound is the same as reported for a type-2 network with four branches [33].
We will establish our bounds via exhaustive enumeration. Type-2 Feistel
networks update their odd branches by XORing them with the result of a
function of the corresponding even branch: new_odd := F(even) XOR odd.
There are two simple properties (numbered 3 and 4 [61][p. 83]) regarding
the propagation of differences. First, if both even and odd are differentially
inactive, then so is new_odd. Second, at least two of them are active if any
of the three are active. Thus, given an input configuration (i.e. whether
each branch is differentially active), the output is active if exactly one input
is active. The inputs are booleans, so this corresponds to simply XORing
them. Next, our simulator counts the number of active functions (i.e. the
number of differentially active even input branches), shuffles the outputs
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and passes them as inputs to the next round. This process is repeated for
every round up to the desired limit. We consider all 216 input configurations
except the trivial case of zero input differences. This logic is implemented
by the following Python script.
# ( Over ) e s t imate s a lower bound o f d i f f e r e n t i a l l y a c t i v e
# f u n c t i o n s in a 16−branch g e n e r a l i z e d F e i s t e l network .
ROUNDS = range (6 )
BRANCHES = 16
idx = range (BRANCHES / 2) # i n d i c e s with in odd/even
b i t s h i f t s = [ 2 ∗ i f o r i in idx ]
# S h u f f l e : ‘ Improving the Genera l i zed F e i s t e l ’ No.10
s h u f f l e f o r n e w o d d = ( 3 , 6 , 5 , 1 , 7 , 4 , 0 , 2 ) # = even i / 2
s h u f f l e f o r n e w e v e n = ( 1 , 2 , 4 , 3 , 0 , 5 , 7 , 6 ) # = odd i / 2
m i n a c t i v e f u n c s = 99999
de f XorResult ( even , xor ) :
# Page 83 in ‘ Genera l i zed F e i s t e l networks r e v i s i t e d ’ .
# 3) i f even ( input to F) and the XOR input are both
# zero ( i n a c t i v e ) , so i s the XOR r e s u l t .
i f even == 0 and xor == 0 : re turn 0
# 4) otherwise , at l e a s t two o f the inputs / output are
# a c t i v e => an i n a c t i v e input i m p l i e s a c t i v e output .
i f even == 0 and xor == 1 : re turn 1
i f even == 1 and xor == 0 : re turn 1
# Assume i n a c t i v e => overe s t imate the lower bound !
re turn 0
# For every combination o f d i f f e r e n t i a l l y a c t i v e
# branches except a l l−zero ( no a c t i v e f u n c t i o n s ) :
f o r b i t s in range (1 , 1 << BRANCHES) :
# Extract b i t s i n to i n t e g e r s , p a r t i t i o n in to even/odd .
even = [ ( ( b i t s >> b i t s h i f t s [ i ] ) & 1) f o r i in idx ]
odd = [ ( ( b i t s >> ( b i t s h i f t s [ i ] + 1) ) & 1) f o r i in idx ]
# Total d i f f e r e n t i a l l y a c t i v e f u n c t i o n s .
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a c t i v e f u n c s = 0
f o r round in ROUNDS:
# Active f u n c t i o n s ( nonzero even [ ] ) in t h i s round .
a c t i v e f u n c s += even . count (1 )
# S h u f f l e ( even ) w i l l l a t e r r e p l a c e the cur rent odd .
new odd = [ even [ s h u f f l e f o r n e w o d d [ i ] ] f o r i in idx ]
# S h u f f l e (F( even , odd ) ) r e p l a c e s the cur rent even .
f o u t = [ XorResult ( even [ i ] , odd [ i ] ) f o r i in idx ]
even = [ f o u t [ s h u f f l e f o r n e w e v e n [ i ] ] f o r i in idx ]
odd = new odd
# Remember and repor t the lowest .
m i n a c t i v e f u n c s = min ( min ac t ive func s , a c t i v e f u n c s )
p r i n t m i n a c t i v e f u n c s
Note an important limitation of this algorithm: Property 4 does not
provide any guidance when both inputs are active. The differences may
cancel, or not. Thus, this algorithm does not guarantee a lower bound, but
it does indicate such a bound is at most six. We now extend the search
to cover all these possibilities and thus obtain a lower bound. The search
can be paused and resumed from a ‘state’ consisting of the round number,
odd/even status, and the number of active functions so far. When both
inputs are active, we enqueue new states with every possible combination of
the output. Although quick to compute for six rounds, additional rounds
yield trillions of possible combinations. We retain a brute-force approach,
but add some optimizations to make the search tractable. First, the odd and
even differentially-active status can be represented as separate bit arrays,
such that all calls to XorResult simplify to a single 8-bit XOR and the
shuffle reduces to an 8-bit table lookup. Second, we can prune search areas
where active_funcs already exceeds the minimum seen so far, because they
will not influence the lower bound. Third, a fixed-size priority-queue with
bitwise operations reduces the space and time overhead to constants. The
C++ source code corresponding to this description will later be open-sourced
alongside the Randen implementation [39]. It can trace about a trillion
combinations arising during 18 rounds within a few minutes on a workstation
with 24 cores.
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